Abstract. The oracle c.c.c. is closely related to Cohen forcing. During an iteration we can "omit a type"; i.e. preserve "the intersection of a given family of Borel sets of reals is empty" provided that Cohen forcing satisfies it. We generalize this to other cases. In Section 1 we replace Cohen by "nicely" definable c.c.c., do the parallel of the oracle c.c.c. and end with a criterion for extracting a subforcing (not a complete subforcing, l!) of a given nicely one and satisfying the oracle.
Introduction
This answers a question from [2, Chapter IV] (the chapter dealing with the oracle c.c.c.) asking to replace Cohen by e.g. random. Later we will deal with the parallel for oracle proper and for the caseφ α is a (definition of a) nep forcing. An application will appear in a work with T. Bartoszynski.
How do we use this framework? We start with a universe satisfying ♦ ℵ 1 and probably 2 ℵ 1 = ℵ 2 and choose S * i : i < ω 2 , S * i ⊆ S * ⊆ ω 1 such that S * i /D ω 1 is strictly increasing and for every i < ω 2 , ♦ S * i+1 \S * i holds and for simplicity S * i ⊆ S * i+1 where D ω 1 is the club filter on ω 1 . We choose by induction on i < ω 2 , a c.c.c. forcing P i of cardinality ℵ 1 , a sequenceM i = M i α : α ∈ S * i of countable models ⊆ (H(ℵ 1 ), ∈) of some version of ZFC, without loss of generality transitive and a 1-commitment mainly connected to a P i -name ν i α which is, e.g. random over M i α (and the commitment is that if, j > i, P j ∼ = P j /P i is represented such that it has set of elements ⊆ ω 1 , G ⊆ P j is generic over V P i , then for a club of α ∈ S i , ν i α ∈ V P i is random also over M i α [G] which naturally is M i α [G ∩ α] ). They are increasing in the relevant sense and the work at limit stages is done by the general claims here. In stage i, by bookkeeping we are given a task connected with a P iname X i we have some freedom in choosing P i+1 , usually P i+1 = P i * Q i . So, working in V P i , Q i has to satisfy a 0-commitment on S * i , and we like it to satisfy that task, usually connected with
We essentially have to chooseM i+1 such thatM i+1 S * i =M i but we have freedom (in addition to choosing Q i ) to choose M i+1 α : α ∈ S * i+1 \S * i and a 0-commitment on S * i+1 \S * i . Also the reals generic for the chosen forcing notion (for α ∈ S * i !) as well as M i+1 α for α ∈ S * i+1 \S * i can be chosen considering X i . E.g. M i+1 α can be the Mostowski Collapse of some M ≺ (H(ℵ 2 ), ∈) to which P i ,M i and X i belong.
Really this corresponds to the omitting type as in [1, XI] . This was originally part of [4] , particularly close to faking. (a) We assume CH, moreover ♦ S * where S * ⊆ {δ < ω 1 : δ limit} is stationary.
Definition/Notation 1.2. 1)M denotes an oracle, i.e., a sequence of the form M δ : δ ∈ S , M δ a transitive countable model of ZF C − * satisfying δ ⊆ M δ and S ⊆ S * is stationary satisfying: for every X ⊆ ω 1 , the set {δ ∈ S * : X ∩ δ ∈ M δ } is stationary.
2) D denotes a normal filter on ω 1 usually extending DM which is defined in 1.3(1) below (of course, the default value is DM , see 1.4(1)).
3) For a countable forcing P, a wide P-name is a Borel function giving for every directed G ⊆ P an object (so if P ≤ ic P then any wide P-name is still a wide P -name hence a P -name).
We first give the old definitions from [3, IV]
2) A forcing notion P of cardinality ≤ ℵ 1 satisfies the (M , D)-c.c. if for some (equivalently any) one to one f : P → ω 1 the set: δ ∈ SM : if X ∈ M δ and {y ∈ P: f (y) < δ and f (y) ∈ X} is predense in P {y ∈ P: f (y) < δ} then X is predense in P belongs to D and P has minimal element ∅ P . 
3) We can find S
4) IfM 1 ≤M 2 and the forcing notion P 2 satisfies the (M 2 , D)-c.c. and
Proof. See [3, IV] , but for the reader's convenience we prove part (4).
Without loss of generality P 2 has cardinality ℵ 1 and even set of elements ω 1 . As P 1 l P 2 there is a function f :
So there is a club E of ω 1 which is closed under f, g so
[Why? If q ∈ P 2 ∩ δ then f (q) ∈ P 1 ∩ δ so by the assumption on I, f (q) is compatible with some r 1 ∈ I ∈ P 1 ∩ δ, so there is r 2 ∈ P 1 δ above 2) We may forget to mention this case as it is by now easy. 
We ignoreM if clear from the context. We can replaceM by
for an ℵ 1 -oracleM (we may suppress) if: P is a forcing notion and for any one-to-one mapping h :
(e) [the old case]: if α ∈ S∩E even when Q α is a singleton (hence ν α ∈ M α , a degenerated case), then every predense subset I of {p ∈ P: h(p) < α} for which {h(p) : p ∈ I} ∈ M α is a predense subset of P.
pair as in 1.6(1)(a), both are hereditarily countable over P (c)ν = ν α : α ∈ S and ν α a P-name of a real given by countably many conditions (d) the set of the α ∈ S satisfying the following belongs to (DM + S) + :φ α ∈ M α , Mos Col Nα (N α ) ∈ M α , and letting
we have M α |= "φ α is a wide P α -name of an absolute definition of a c.c.c. forcing with generic real η α " and P "the real ν α is a
For simplicity the reader may concentrate on the case (φ α , η α ) : α ∈ S ∈ V.
3) Let
. forcing notion and Y is a 1-commitment on P}.
We shall omitM if clear from the context. We can replaceM by (M , D)-naturally and write IS D , but the claims are the same.
We call E a witness to (
We point out the connection between 0-commitment and 1-commitment.
is a singleton (i.e., δ of the old case for Y)} and
As a warm-up (see [4] for more)
Then we can find a countable P 2 such that
2) Similarly for ϕ defining a nep forcing.
1.8
Crucial Claim 1.9. In IS, any ≤ * -increasing ω-chain has an upper bound.
Remark. 1) The ω-limit is the crucial one not the ω 1 -limit? Actually for ω 1 -limit we take the union and we preserve what we need by using the square (and having done something toward it in earlier limits or stages of cofinality ℵ 0 ). 2) When is the union not an upper bound? If, e.g., for each α ∈ S ⊆ S Y the forcing note ϕ Y α is random real forcing we have in particular to preserve {ν α : α ∈ S } is non-null, but the union normally adds a Cohen.
for n < ω, letM be such thatM ≥M n for each n; so let E n ∈ DM witness both. For simplicity assume that above any p ∈ P n there are two incompatible elements, and 0 ∈ P 0 is minimal in all P n , i.e. is ∅ Pn . Without loss of generality the set of elements of P n is ⊆ ω 1 and ω 1 \ n<ω P n has cardinality ℵ 1 and let X * be such that n<ω P n ⊆ X * ⊆ ω 1 and |X * \ n<ω P n | = ℵ 1 ; this notation helps in a future use, also there we replace ω by a (countable) ordinal of cofinality ℵ 0 . We can define functions F n , F n,m , F n,m, (when n < m < ω, < ω) such that (a) n if p, q ∈ P n are compatible then F n (p, q) ∈ P n is a common upper bound (b) n,m if n < m and p ∈ P m , then F n,m, (p) : < ω is a maximal antichain of P n , such that for each : either p, F n,m, (p) are incompatible (in P m ) or p is compatible in P m with every q ∈ P n which is above
We would like to define a forcing notion P ω with universe X * , and 1-commitment Y ω , and functions F ω , F n,ω, satisfying the natural requirements. First, let
Defining P ω , F ω , F n,ω, is harder, so we first define AP , a set of approximations to it. A member t of AP has the form (
< ω is a maximal antichain of P n , the members are < δ t , and for each , either p, F t n,ω, (p) are incompatible in P t or (∀q ∈ P n ∩ δ) (P n |= "F n,ω, (p) ≤ q" ⇒ p, q are compatible in P t ) and for at least one the second case occurs
(η) Γ t is a sequence p t ζ : ζ < ζ t , ζ t < ω 1 andp t ζ is a sequence of length ω of members of P t which form a maximal antichain (of P t ) (θ) if p ∈ P t and n < m < ω and r ∈ P n ∩δ t and [r ≤ r ∈ P n ∩δ t ⇒ r , p are compatible in P t ], then the set {F t m,ω, (p) : < ω and p is compatible with F t m,ω, (p) in P t } satisfies: if r ≤ q ∈ P n then in P m , q is compatible with some member of this set (ι) if ζ < ζ t and n < ω then:
ζ,k ) are compatible in P t } is a predense subset of P n . Note that trivially this subset is predense in P n ∩ δ t ; similarly in clause (κ) Moreover, (κ) if p * ∈ P t and n < ω and ζ < ζ t then
(ii) for some k < ω and p we have
has an upper bound in P t ] and
is predense in P n . * * *
We define the (natural) partial order ≤ * on AP : for t, s ∈ AP as follows; we let t ≤ * s iff:
Proof. Easy: choose δ ∈ E, let
where n(p, q) = Min{n : p ∈ P n and q ∈ P n }.
Lastly, Γ = empty sequence.
Fact B. If t ∈ AP and δ t < δ ∈ E, then there is s satisfying t ≤ * s ∈ AP with δ s ≥ δ, ζ s = ζ t .
Proof. Without loss of generality t, P n δ : n < ω , X * ∩ δ belongs to M δ and δ ∈ E ∩ n<ω E n and X * ∩ δ\ n<ω P n \δ t is infinite and even has order type δ. [Why? As ∅ / ∈ DM and we can increase δ.] So (for the last phrase see the proof of 1.4(4)) ( * ) any J ∈ M δ which is a predense subset of P n δ is a predense subset of P n and n < m ⇒ P n δ l P m δ.
We define a forcing notion Q, with set of elements ⊆ A × B identifying (p, 0) with p and (0, q) with q. Now (p, q) ∈ A × B belongs to Q iff: p = 0 or q = 0 or there are r ∈ A ∩ B and n = n(p, q) such that: P n |= "r ≤ q", and (∀r ) [r ≤ r ∈ P n ∩ δ t → r , p compatible in P t ]; we call such r a witness and n a possible value for n(p, q). The order on Q is
(γ) If (p, q) ∈ Q, m = n(p, q) and q ∈ P m δ and P m δ |= "q ≤ q " and [Why? Let r ∈ P n(p,q) be a witness in particular r is compatible with p in P t . By clause (θ) of the Definition of AP the set J = {F t m,ω, (p) : < ω and p is compatible with F t m,ω, (p) in P t } is predense above r in P m . P n |= r ≤ q hence P m |= r ≤ q so for some , F t m,ω, (p) ∈ J is compatible with q in P m so there is
[Why? Let (p 0 , q 0 ) ∈ Q, of course, we can replace this pair by any larger one, so by clause (δ) above without loss of generality some m ∈ [n, ω), is a possible value for n(p 0 , q 0 ) so we have q 0 ∈ P m δ, hence recalling that P n δ l P m δ there is q 1 ∈ P n δ such that: (∀r ∈ P n )(P n δ |= q 1 ≤ r ⇒ r, q 0 compatible in P m δ). Assume q 1 ≤ r ∈ P n δ. So r, q 0 are compatible in P m δ hence has a common upper bound q 2 ∈ P m δ. In particular q 0 ≤ q 2 ∈ P m δ so by clause (γ) we have (p 0 , q 2 ) ∈ Q and (p 0 , q 0 ) ≤ Q (p 0 , q 2 ); also r = (0, r) ≤ (p 0 , q 2 ) as r ≤ q 2 together r, (p 0 , q 0 ) are compatible in Q, so [q 1 ≤ r ∈ P n n ⇒ (p 0 , q 0 ), r = (0, r) are compatible in Q]. As (p 0 , q 0 ) ∈ Q was arbitrary we are done.] (ζ) If p 1 , p 2 ∈ P t are incompatible in P t then they are incompatible in Q.
[Why? Look at the order of Q]. for k < ω. Let n < ω be a possible value of n(p * , q * ) so q * ∈ P n δ and there is a witness r * ≤ q * , r * ∈ P n δ t for (p * , q * ) ∈ Q.
By clause (κ) in the definition of t ∈ AP we know that for some r ∈ P n ∩ δ t we have:
(ii) q * , r are compatible in P n . As q * , r are compatible and r * ≤ q * also r * , r are compatible in P n hence in P n ∩ δ t , so by the demand on r * , we have: r, p * are compatible in P t . So in clause (κ) of the definition of AP , in the definition of I t ζ,n,p * for our r subclause (i) fails hence subclause (ii) holds so there are k, p as in subclause (ii) there. Also let q 1 ∈ P n δ be a common upper bound of q * , r. So r witness that (p , q 1 ) ∈ Q with n a possible value of n(p , q 1 ). Clearly it is above (p * , q * ) and above p t ζ,k so we are done.] Let δ s = δ. Clearly Q ∈ M δ and M δ |= "|Q δ | ≤ |δ|" so, as X * ∩ δ \ n P n has order type δ and P t is bounded in it, there is f ∈ M δ such that f : Q → X * ∩δ is a one to one (into or even onto), extending id A ∪ id B , and define P s such that f is an isomorphism from Q onto P s . We can define F s ω , F s n,ω, (n, < ω) extending F t ω , F s n,ω, as required, e.g., F s n,ω, ((p, q)) = F s n,m, (q) for some m > n such that q ∈ P m except when q = 0 then F s n,ω, ((p, 0)) = F t n,ω, (p). Now it is easy to check clause (θ) of the definition of s ∈ AP , recalling ( * ) above and clauses (i), (κ) holds since the construction is made in M δ . Lastly, let Γ s = Γ t .
Fact C. If t n ∈ AP and t n ≤ * t n+1 for n < ω then there is t such that n < ω ⇒ t n ≤ * t ∈ AP and δ t = n<ω δ t n and ζ t = n<ω ζ t n .
[Why? Just let δ t , ζ t be as above, Now let P ω = ε<ω 1 P t ε and it should be clear how to define Y ω ; now check the requirements.
1.9
Definition 1.10. LetC * = C * δ : δ < ω 2 a limit ordinal (and C * α = ∅ otherwise) be a square sequence andX * = X * i : i < ω 1 be an increasing sequence of subsets of ω 1 ,
as in the proof of 1.9 (using X * j : j ∈ acc(C * i ) ,
replace ω and we generate t i α : α < ω 1 and by it define
and for j 1 < j 2 from acc(C * i ) the ordinal δ belongs to the club {α < ω 1 : α limit closed under the functions F j 1 and F j 1 ,j 2 (see clause (f) below)} and δ , q) is the <-first common upper bound of p and q in P j and if
Proof. If cf(ζ) = ℵ 0 we use 1.9 but taking care of clause (e), this just dictates to us how to start the induction there. If cf(ζ) = ℵ 1 , then by the square bookkeeping (see clause (e) in Definition 1.10) our work is done (using f ζ = ∪{f ξ : ξ ∈ acc(C ζ )}).
1.11
Claim 1.12. 1) Assume
Then for some P-name Q and 1-commitment Y 2 we have:
If for every G P ⊆ P generic over V there are Q satisfying some ψ 1 and 
3)
We may allow (φ α ,η α ) : α ∈ S 1 be a sequence of P-names and even (P * Q )-names.
Proof. Straight. Claim 1.13 (iteration in successor case: increase the commitment).
Lastly Z α ⊆ ω 2 is a P ξ -name of a positive set for (φ α , η α ) for every such α.
Then we can find
Proof. Straight. 
is a forcing notion with set of elements beings
Proof. Straight. Conclusion 1.15. Assume (C * ,X * ) is as in 1.9. Let Φ be a set of definitions of forcing notions with some real parameters, and S * i : i < ω 2 is as in 1.4 for DM .
We can find
P i is a c.c.c. forcing notion of cardinality ℵ 2 (so in V P , 2 ℵ 0 ≤ ℵ 2 ) and except in degenerated cases equality holds
is a case of Φ as in 1.6, moreover
(even less with more bookkeeping) and Z ⊆ ( ω 2) V P is positive for
, in fact the set is forced to include such old set (from V) by this we can get (β) for some
H is a pregiven function such that for every i < ω 2 and (P, Y,M ) satisfying
(Of course, we can promise this for ℵ 2 such functions).
Proof. Put together the previous claims. (Concerning clause (e) without loss of generality {i < ω 1 : otp(C * i ) = 0} is stationary) so in those stages we have no influence of clause (e) of 1.10; anyhow the influence of 1.10(e) is minor. Discussion 1.16. We discuss here some possible extensions. 
In the i-th move:
(a) the bookkeeper chooses P i and a P i -name (M
In the end the bookkeeper wins if
Proof. Similar to earlier proofs.
We give an easy criterion for existence. The following uses more from [4] . Remark. Why the ϕ δ 's? We hope it helps, for example in the following; suppose we are given f : R → R, we like to force A ⊆ R which is not in I Qφ α and on which the function f is continuous; i.e. to force a continuous f * such that {η ∈ ω 2 : f * (η) = f (η)} ∈ (I ex Q ) + . So not only do we like to find q "η δ is (Q δ , η δ )-generic over M δ [G P ]" but also q P "f (η δ ) = f (η δ )". This is whatφ says. (On I Qφ α , I ex Q see [4] .)
Proof. We choose by induction on α < ω 1 , a pair (P α , Γ α ) such that:
(α) P α ⊆ P is countable (β) Γ α is a countable family of predense subsets of P α (γ) if I ∈ Γ α and p ∈ P α and n < ω then for some q we have p ≤ n q ∈ P α and I is predense above q in P (δ) P α is increasing continuous in α (ε) Γ α is increasing continuous in α.
Case 1: α = 0. Trivial.
Case 2: α = β + 1, β non-limit or (P β , Γ β ) / ∈ M β .
Let (P α , Γ α ) = (P β , Γ β ).
Case 3: α limit.
Let (P α , Γ α ) = β<α P β , β<α Γ β .
Case 4: α = δ + 1 where δ is a limit ordinal and (P δ , Γ δ ) ∈ M δ .
We can find g ⊆ Levy(ℵ 0 , |P|) M δ , generic over M δ such that η * δ is still Q δ -generic over M δ [g] (see [4, §6] ( * ) for every p ∈ P δ and n < ω there is p ∈ P + δ such that P |= p ≤ n p . Again by [4, §6] for every n < ω and p ∈ P + δ , there is q p,n ∈ P such that p ≤ n q p,n ∈ P, q p,n is (M δ [g], Q)-generic and q p,n P "ν δ is a (Q δ , η δ )-generic
Let P δ+1 = P δ ∪ {q p,n : p ∈ P + δ and n < ω} and Γ δ+1 = Γ δ ∪ {I δ } where I δ = {q p,n : p ∈ P + δ and n < ω}. 1.18 
